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Abstract
In oligopolistic industries that are unionised and may be affected by offshoring,
falling offshoring costs have a moderating effect on trade unions. They will accept
lower sector wages in order to discourage mobile firms from leaving the country. Since
such wages are independent of the workers’ domestic outside opportunities, wage mod-
eration - induced by deeper economic integration - creates leeway for the government
to engage in redistributive policies even if this improves the workers’ domestic outside
options. Only if the latter become sufficiently attractive will redistribution induce some
offshoring, and it is only at that level that further economic integration will lead to
both wage moderation and offshoring activities. Therefore, our analysis suggests that
rather than provoking a downsizing of the welfare state, offshoring defines an upper
limit for the generosity of the welfare state below which redistribution becomes less
instead of more distortive.
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In recent years, industrialised countries have seen considerable outward relocations of pro-
duction. Not surprisingly, due to its direct impact on employment, offshoring has become
an increasingly important topic in public debates, particularly in countries characterised by
high unemployment and low job creation.
In line with the growing trend towards foreign direct investment (FDI), an impressive amount
of literature on the determinants and the welfare implications of inward FDI has emerged.
Far less attention has been devoted to the determinants and consequences of outward FDI,
which – in the presence of regulated labour markets and state-provided welfare arrangements
– are increasingly prone to generating conflict between labour unions, employers’ organisa-
tions and policy-makers.
In general, from the perspective of old industrialised countries, the importance of outward
relocations of production may have grown due to several novel developments, such as (i) an
increasing supply of low-wage, highly skilled labour, (ii) the reduction in the costs of global
communication due to advances in financial, information and communication technologies,
(iii) the improved tradability of services which can be delivered electronically and do not
require face-to-face contact, and (iv) financial liberalisation and the rise in capital mobility.
It is a widely established fact that one of the key determinants of location choices for pro-
duction is the cost of labour (see e.g. Barrell and Pain, 1996; Hatzius, 1998, 2000; Pennings
and Sleuwaegen, 2000, 2006 for empirical evidence). Labour unions are frequently blamed
for strengthening the trend towards moving production to lower-wage countries.1 In many
European countries, trade unions succeed in keeping wage rates above the market-clearing
level, thus raising domestic wage costs and strengthening the tendency towards offshore
production. This effect may be exaggerated by government interventions including high
tax rates on labour income and high social insurance contributions combined with generous
unemployment benefits, because these policy measures increase wage pressure in wage ne-
gotiations between trade unions and firms (see e.g. Lockwood, 1990; Goerke, 1999; Daveri
and Tabellini, 2000; Nickell, 2003; Koskela and Scho¨b, 2002) and, may consequently further
increase the incentives for firms to move production offshore. Notwithstanding the impres-
1Although the number of union members in the OECD has declined over the last two decades, the share
of employees whose remuneration and working conditions are directly or indirectly determined by collective
bargaining is still considerable. In the EU, this share ranged from 30% in the UK to 68% in Germany, 90%
in Belgium, Finland, France and Sweden, and 95% in Austria in the year 2000 (OECD, 2004).
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sive growth in labour taxation and social insurance contributions in most OECD countries,2
the economic literature on fiscal policy and FDI has almost exclusively focused on capital
taxation and lump sum policies.
Our investigation builds on two strands of literature, namely the literature on FDI and
the literature on non-competitive labour markets and taxation. The question we address is
how, in the presence of a unionised labour force and internationally mobile and immobile
oligopolistic firms, the redistributive policies of the welfare state affect domestic employ-
ment in industries which are potentially susceptible to offshoring. This involves exploring
how firms and labour unions interact and respond to changes in the social security system
in the face of global competition.
The main features of our model are as follows: We consider an industry consisting of two
profit-maximising firms that produce a homogeneous good using labour as the only factor of
production. The workers in the industry constitute only a small fraction of the overall labour
force. Accordingly, welfare policy is exogenous from this industry’s point of view. Wages
are negotiated by a labour union and domestically located firms. The government imposes a
tax on wages and uses the revenue to finance unemployment insurance payments and other
public goods. Within the sector, not all companies are equally able to take advantage of
cheaper technology by means of offshoring. Specifically, we assume that both firms differ
in terms of mobility, as only one of them, a multi-national enterprise (MNE), may choose
to relocate its production facility to a foreign country from which it can serve the domestic
market.
The main result is as follows. When offshoring becomes attractive for mobile firms, the trade
union is tamed. It will moderate sector wages in such a way as to discourage the mobile
firm from leaving the country. In fact, the negotiated wage rate becomes independent of
the workers’ domestic outside opportunities and as such creates leeway for the government
to engage in redistributive policies. Thus, in the presence of firm mobility there remains
scope for substantial redistribution without the threat of losing production. Only if work-
ers’ domestic outside opportunities are sufficiently attractive, redistribution induces some
offshoring and it is only at that level that further economic integration will lead to both
wage moderation and offshoring activities.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 links this work to related literature. Section
2See Joumard (2001). In the EU-25, labour tax revenues contribute to around half of total tax receipts
and finance most social welfare programmes (European Commission, 2006).
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3 describes our model of a single-sector unionised duopoly. In section 4, we then look at
the alternative interactions between the union and the firms during wage negotiations. The
union’s stance with regard to offshoring serves to determine the equilibrium wage depending
on the workers’ outside option. The impact of increased economic integration on domestic
wage negotiations is then analysed in section 5. Section 6 endogenises the outside option of
workers and shows how wage negotiations and offshoring are affected by the government’s
welfare policy. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
Most theoretical contributions on the welfare implications of (inward or outward) FDI in the
presence of unionised labour markets focus on the conflict of interest between unions and
firms without considering public policy.3 Exceptions include Bughin and Vannini (1995),
Leahy and Montagna (2000), and Skaksen (2005), who quantify the potential welfare gain
from inward FDI as a measure for a lump sum subsidy. Brander and Spencer (1988) and
Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991), on the other hand, examine the effects of trade policy.
Another stream of literature analyses the incentives of governments to attract inward FDI
by means of capital taxes. As noted by Desai et al. (2004), studies on the effects of tax
policy on the location of FDI focus almost exclusively on corporate income taxes.4 The role
of distortionary labour taxation on the cost side of mobile firms (or production) and its
welfare implications has been analysed by Aronsson and Sjo¨gren (2004), Rocha-Akis (2007),
Koskela and Scho¨b (2009), Koskela and Poutvaara (2009), and Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009).
Anderson (2003) has shed light on the link between firm mobility and the implementation
of welfare programmes but focuses on changes in the degree of centralisation of the labour
market and their implications for the costs of maintaining publicly financed welfare systems.
In a multi-country model, Aronsson and Sjo¨gren (2004) focus on optimal labour taxation
and policy coordination when firms are mobile and labour is unionised. In their framework,
competitive firms which may relocate to another jurisdiction use the potential profit ob-
tainable abroad as a threat during wage negotiations. The assumptions that all firms are
identical and that redistributive policies are adjusted in such a way as to maximise welfare
3E.g. Zhao (1995, 1998), Naylor and Santoni (1998), Skaksen and Sørensen (2001), Lommerud et al.
(2003), Munch (2003), Skaksen (2004), Eckel and Egger (2009).
4Examples which consider this link in the presence of unionised labour markets include Boadway et al.
(2002), and Haufler and Mittermaier (2008).
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imply that relocation never takes place in equilibrium, as national governments coordinate
optimally by reducing unemployment benefits and thus also wages.
Rocha-Akis (2007) analyses labour taxation and transfer policy in situations where imper-
fectly competitive firms may relocate abroad and the domestic labour market is unionised,
showing how the specification of the government’s objective determines the equilibrium out-
come. One result is that a government that attaches sufficient weight to domestic consumer
and producer surplus may find it optimal to set a high tax-and-transfer schedule even if it
pushes part of production abroad, thus reducing domestic output and employment. This is
because such a policy enforces lower wage demands from unions and therefore enhances the
profits of domestically located producers as well as total output.
Koskela and Scho¨b (2009) investigate the implications of alternative labour tax reforms for
domestic employment when identical and perfectly competitive firms face a unionised work-
force that can be partly substituted by foreign labour in outsourcing arrangements. Their
main findings are that a decrease in outsourcing costs may bring about a wage moderation ef-
fect that dominates the labour substitution effect, thereby enhancing domestic employment.
Moreover, the negative employment consequences of higher labour taxes, higher unemploy-
ment benefits and lower tax exemption rates are shown to be magnified in the presence of
outsourcing.
Using a two-country setup with perfectly competitive firms, Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009)
analyse how outsourcing affects welfare policies in high-wage economies. The model allows
for high and low-skilled workers, with only the latter running the risk of unemployment due
to outsourcing. The labour market for low-skilled workers is described within a matching
framework, while the wage rate of high-skilled workers is fixed. It turns out that an increase
in the unemployment benefits increases the wages of low-skilled workers and leads to an
unambiguous marginal increase in aggregate outsourcing activity. On the other hand, more
redistribution by means of a higher tax used to finance a tax cut for low-skilled workers con-
tributes to a decrease in low-skilled workers’ gross wages, while increasing their net wages
and thereby stimulating labour market participation. The paper concludes that governments
should expand the welfare state to provide better insurance.
Several empirical studies on the effects of outward relocations on employment and wages
have been conducted. In this context it should be noted that comprehensive measures of
production relocations are hardly available. This may reflect a serious data collection prob-
5
lem since shifts of production are at best concealed within the broader data categories of FDI
and imports. Based on intermediate good import data as a measure of cross-border sourcing
of intermediate inputs, this literature is generally inconclusive regarding the net effects on
domestic labour demand. A majority of studies, however, find that international outsourc-
ing (also referred to as offshore outsourcing) seeks to reduce costs and tends to drive down
wages or, in the presence of wage rigidities, decrease employment among low-skilled workers
in the country where production was initially carried out. Moreover, low-skilled workers
in low-wage countries are generally believed to be complements to high-skilled workers in
high-wage countries.5 Empirical contributions examining the potential link between wel-
fare policies and production relocations are rare. Using firm-level data, a recent study by
Delbecque et al. (2008) analyses whether and how various dimensions of labour market
regulation affect firms’ expansion strategies in foreign countries. The results indicate that
among other institutional arrangements stringent employment protection laws, a generous
unemployment benefit system, strong minimum wage constraints, and powerful trade unions
significantly reduce the propensity of firms to locate in a country.
3 Firm behaviour
Our model extends Bughin and Vannini’s (1995) unionised oligopoly model of FDI by in-
corporating a redistributive welfare state. In this context, we primarily focus on a single
industry consisting of a duopoly that produces a homogeneous good. The duopolists face a
trade union which operates throughout the industry in the home country. In the background
there is a second country, referred to as the foreign country, which is considered exogenous
in our model. The two firms differ in terms of mobility: Firm d is assumed to be immobile,
whereas firm f is a branch plant of an MNE which has the option of moving production
abroad. The domestic government taxes labour income and provides benefits for unemployed
workers. The domestic welfare policy, which is exogenous from the industry’s viewpoint, has
an impact on the labour union’s bargaining strategy as it affects the workers’ outside option,
which in turn influences firms’ investment and cross-border location decisions and thus the
level of domestic production and employment.
5See for example Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Egger, Pfaffermayr and Wolfmayr (2001), Egger and Egger
(2003), Ekholm and Hakkala (2006) and Falk and Wolfmayr (2005). Making use of plant-level data for the
Irish Electronics sector, Go¨rg and Hanley (2005) find that offshore outsourcing significantly decreases labour
demand in the short-run. Crino` (2009) provides an extensive overview of the empirical literature.
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Two different scenarios are possible: In the first scenario, both firms produce domestically.
In the second scenario, the mobile firm has relocated abroad. Whereas in the former case
both firms are subject to wage negotiations with a domestic labour union, in the latter
scenario only the immobile firm has to pay the negotiated wage, while the mobile firm faces
exogenously determined foreign labour input costs. Our aim is to analyse the extent to
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Figure 1: Timing of events.
Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of decisions over time. The sector takes the tax policy
decisions made in stage 1 as given when wage negotiations take place. Given the negotiated
wage rate, the MNE decides on its production location in stage 3. Finally, each firm chooses
its optimal output and employment level. Since the location decision as well as the output
and employment decisions are anticipated in the wage negotiations, we solve the problem
recursively by means of backwards induction.
3.1 Output and employment
Both firms produce a homogeneous good and face a linear inverse demand function of the
form p(Q) = α−βQ, where α, β > 0, p is the output price, and Q = qd+qf denotes the sum
of individual quantities produced by firms d and f . Labour is the only factor of production.
Each firm i = d, f has access to the same linear technology, which is normalised in such a
way that one unit of output is produced with one unit of labour. Thus, qi represents both
output and labour input. Labour is remunerated at a gross wage rate of ωi. Consequently,
the profit functions are pii = [p(Q)− ωi] qi, where 0 < ωi < α ensures positive equilibrium
production. In stage 4, each firm i takes the wage outcome (ωd, ωf ) resulting from wage
bargaining as given and strategically chooses its profit-maximising employment and output
level qi. The resulting equilibrium output of firm i is a function of both firms’ labour costs
and given by
qi(ωi, ωj) =
α− 2ωi + ωj
3β
, i = d, f, i 6= j (1)
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reflecting the fact that the optimal choice of output by firm i in strategic quantity-setting
depends on the output produced in the competing firm j. Substituting (1) into the profit
function, we can express profits as follows:6
pii(ωi, ωj) = β [qi(ωi, ωj)]
2
, i = d, f (2)
3.2 The location decision
If the internationally mobile firm decides not to offshore, it faces the same domestic industry
wage as its immobile competitor. Otherwise, it faces the given foreign wage ωf and the
fixed relocation cost K. The latter may capture factors such as putting infrastructure in
place, laying off employees at home, hiring and training new workers, paying for legal and
consulting fees, and the like.7 The firm chooses the location where the profit is highest.
Therefore, firm f relocates if pirf (ωf , ω
r
d) −K ≥ pinf (ωn, ωn). Throughout the analysis, the
superscripts r and n refer to variables in the regime with and without outward relocation,
respectively. Since the profits from domestic (foreign) production decrease (increase) with
the domestic wage, there exists an indifference wage ω˜(ωf ,K) that renders the mobile firm
indifferent to offshoring versus not offshoring, i.e. pirf (ωf , ω˜)−K = pinf (ω˜, ω˜). Using (1) and
(2), this indifference wage is given by
ω˜(ωf ,K) := ωf +
9β
4 (α− ωf )K (3)
Should the domestic wage exceed ω˜(ωf ,K), offshoring will take place; otherwise the mobile
firm will prefer to produce domestically. The indifference wage increases in ωf and K.
Intuitively, the higher the costs associated with offshoring, the higher the domestic wage
can be without triggering the outward relocation of production.
4 Wage bargaining in partial equilibrium
The sector-specific labour force is normalised to unity and represented by a sector-specific
trade union. We assume “right-to-manage” wage formation, that is, the firms and the union
6This is a standard result for the Cournot oligopoly game with linear demand and constant marginal
costs. In this case, each firms’ profit is proportional to the square of its output; see e.g. Jehle and Reny
(2000, p. 162).
7Go¨rg (2002) and Dewit et al. (2003) empirically examine the extent to which a high level of employment
protection discourages outflow FDI.
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bargain over the wage rate, leaving each firm i with the right to subsequently determine the
output and employment levels. Moreover, we abstract from workers’ choices regarding the
allocation of time between work and leisure, and assume that the individual labour supply
is inelastic. Workers employed at firm i earn a net-of-tax wage income ωi(1 − τ) where
τ is the income tax rate. Workers who do not find employment in this industry become
unemployed with a probability equal to the domestic aggregate unemployment rate u, in
which case they are entitled to receive some gross unemployment benefit payments b, or
they find employment in one of the other domestic sectors with a probability of 1−u where
they earn the expected gross wage ω. Thus the individual’s gross outside option is given by
γ = (1− u)ω + ub (4)
The unemployment benefit payments b may be proportional to the average wage or fixed in
order to guarantee a minimum subsistence level of welfare.
In the sections that follow we derive the negotiated wage rate in this sector for a given outside
option by first analysing the case where both firms produce domestically (section 4.1) and
then addressing the scenario where the MNE has moved its plant offshore (section 4.2).
This information is used to analyse the union’s stance towards offshoring and to identify the
scope for wage moderation in section 4.3. Throughout sections 4 and 5, we determine the
wage within a sector, given the behaviour in all other sectors. Finally, we endogenise the
outside option and determine the general equilibrium in section 6.
4.1 Wage bargaining without relocation




(ωi − γ) (1− τ) qi(ωi, ωj), i, j = d, f (5)
where ωi > γ ensures that workers are willing to work in the industry. Notice that the
union has two opposing goals: On the one hand, it aims to negotiate as high a wage rate
in excess of the gross outside income as possible; on the other hand, it strives to achieve as
high a level of employment as possible. The objective of each firm is to maximise its profit.
It is standard practice in the literature on union-firm bargaining to allow for exogenous
relative bargaining power during wage contract negotiations. This is captured by the Nash
9
bargaining product






, i, j = d, f (6)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] and 1− δ denote the relative bargaining power of the union and the firms,
respectively. This formulation reflects the fact that both firms are represented by a joint
bargaining entity, for example an employers’ association, implying that the firms’ bargaining
power is identical. Wage bargaining is thus realised so as to maximise the industry profits,
whereas output is determined in such a way as to maximise the individual firm’s profits. In
effect, firms compete in the output market, but they bargain jointly for wages.8
If the wage negotiations break down, each party ends up receiving the fallback payoff. In
that case, workers would exit the industry and firms would cease production. As they are
chosen by the government at a prior stage, the levels of the policy variables τ and b are
treated as exogenous by both the firms and the union.
Note that we are confronted with a symmetric case in the sense that both the good produced
and the labour force are homogeneous. Consequently, the union treats all workers equally,
thus the equilibrium wage arising from wage bargaining will be identical for all employed
workers regardless of the particular firm at which they are employed. Furthermore, according





where ω = ωd = ωf . As a consequence, the outcome of the bargain will be the wage rate
that maximises the following Nash product




, i, j = d, f (8)
8Zhao (1995) is among the few papers that model asymmetric union-firm bargaining. In his one-way
FDI setting, one union bargains with two firms, of which only one is able to produce abroad in the case of
disagreement. Both firms serve the domestic and the foreign markets. The union’s fallback is the exogenous
competitive wage which is identical in both countries. The model is more general in that each of the three
bargaining parties is allowed to have a different level of relative negotiation power. However, in order for the
problem to remain tractable, it is assumed that bargaining takes place simultaneously and independently
in both countries, and that renegotiation is not possible. Specifically, during wage negotiations in one
country, firms’ output and employment decisions in the other country are taken to be fixed. This is in sharp
contrast to our approach, which is to model the extreme cases of joint bargaining (no relocation regime)
and asymmetric bargaining (relocation regime, discussed in the next section). The asymmetric bargaining,
which ultimately determines the fallback profit of the mobile firm, allows us to consider explicitly how the
domestic firm’s output depends on the competitor’s output, which in turn depends on both countries’ wage
rates. Hence, the competitor’s output decision is endogenous in wage negotiations.
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with 0 ≤ γ < α. One can easily verify that the second-order condition for a maximum is
fulfilled. From (1) we can determine the equilibrium output and employment level:




Expression (9) shows that the wage is a weighted average of the buyers’ maximum willingness
to pay and the workers’ expected outside income, γ, with the weights determined by the
union’s relative power in negotiations. The stronger the union, the more weight is attributed
to α, thus contributing to a higher wage. From (4) it is clear that the wage increases with ω
and b, as these variables raise the expected outside income of union members and therefore
improve their bargaining position. A higher rate of domestic unemployment, on the other
hand, lowers the workers’ expected outside prospects, thereby weakening the negotiation
position of the union and dampening the wage, i.e. ∂γ/∂u = − (ω − b) < 0.
4.2 Wage bargaining with relocation
If the MNE relocates its plant to the foreign country, both firms will choose their output
levels according to equation (1), where the wage rate paid by the offshoring firm, ωf ∈ (0, α),
is exogenous. Both the domestic union and the domestic firm anticipate the asymmetric
game in the product market and bargain over the domestic wage rate. The Nash bargaining
product is given by





θr = (ωd − γ)(1− τ)qd(ωd, ωf ) (12)
9See appendix A.1 for a derivation.
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represents the union rent. Solving for the maximisation problem, we obtain the following
equilibrium gross domestic wage in the relocation regime:10
ωrd(δ, γ, ωf ) =
δ
4






= ωn(δ, γ)− δ
4
(α− ωf ) (13)
where the second-order condition for a maximum is fulfilled. Given δ, γ, and ωf , a com-
parison of expressions (9) and (13) shows that the domestic wage is lower when the mobile
firm has moved abroad. By substituting (13) into (1), we obtain the equilibrium domestic
production and employment level:









= 2qn(δ, γ)− 2− δ
6β
(α− ωf )
In order to rule out a situation where one of the firms becomes a monopolist, equation (1) re-
quires that 2ωf−α ≤ ωrd(δ, γ, ωf ) ≤ (α+ωf )/2, a condition which essentially guarantees that
the domestic wage does not diverge too far with respect to its foreign counterpart. Whereas
the former constraint is always fulfilled if ωf < α/2, the latter constraint is implied by the
requirement of a positive union rent, which in turn implies that γ ≤ γmax(ωf ) := (α+ωf )/2.
Note that in both scenarios – with and without relocation of the MNE – the union rent in-
creases with the domestic wage.11 Since the firms produce the same good, it is not surprising
that for any given level of γ, offshoring results in a lower level of total domestic industry
employment. This is easily shown by a comparison of expressions (10) and (14). Thus, the
union is aware that beyond the negative incremental employment effect associated with an
incremental increase in labour costs, the wage-employment tradeoff may be critically aggra-
vated in the presence of international firm mobility, as a higher wage may translate into
the closure of an entire production facility, thus generating non-linear effects on domestic
employment and wages. It is precisely this rationale that motivates our considerations in
10See appendix A.2 for details.






[α− 2ωn + γ]. Setting ωn = ωn(δ, γ) as specified in (9), we can express the term in square
brackets as (1− δ)(α− γ) > 0. Therefore, ∂θn
∂ωn
> 0. Similarly, partially differentiating (12) with respect to






α− 4ωd + 2γωf
]
. Using expression (13), the term in
brackets becomes (α+ ωf )(1− δ) + 2 [2 + γ(1 + δ)] > 0.
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the next section.
4.3 The union’s attitude towards offshoring and the role of the
workers’ outside option
So far, we have identified the unconstrained negotiated wage for the two scenarios. Ob-
viously, if the negotiated wage as determined by (9) is below the indifference wage, i.e.
ωn(δ, γ) < ω˜(ωf ,K), both firms will produce domestically. This case persists as long as the
outside option is sufficiently low for domestic workers in the sector. More specifically, we
have




4 (α− ωf )K
]
. (15)
If the unconstrained negotiated wage were marginally above the indifference wage, the
mobile firm would move abroad, in which case the negotiated wage would correspond to
ωrd(δ, γ, ωf ) < ω˜(ωf ,K) < ω
n(δ, γ). This cannot be optimal from the viewpoint of the trade
union, since fewer workers would be employed and would also receive a negotiated wage
which is lower than the indifference wage. This effect arises from the marginal cost advan-
tage the offshoring firm would have and use strategically. Since the negotiated wage increases
with the workers’ outside option γ, there is a level γ below which ωrd(δ, γ, ωf ) < ω˜(ωf ,K).
Hence, in the interval γ ∈ [γ, γ] it is in the trade union’s best interest not to expel the
mobile producer from the domestic country, and it can do so by not raising the wage even
if the outside option improves. The equilibrium union rent in the regime without offshoring




n(δ, γ)− γ] (1− τ)2q (ωn(δ, γ)) , if 0 ≤ γ < γ
θcn(γ) = [ω˜(ωf ,K)− γ] (1− τ)2q (ω˜(ωf ,K)) , if γ ≤ γ < ω˜
(16)
where θun is the rent accruing to workers when the union can react to changes in γ without
triggering an outward relocation of production, while θcn denotes the rent derived by the
union when it adopts wage moderation (the superscripts u and c stand for unconstrained
and constrained bargaining, respectively).
The upper part in figure 2 summarises our results so far.12 The horizontal line represents
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Figure 2: Equilibrium wage and union rents.
the indifference wage that is independent of the domestic workers’ outside option. The
ωn(γ)-curve indicates the unconstrained negotiated wage provided that both firms produce
domestically, while the ωrd(γ)-curve expresses the negotiated wage when the mobile firm
competes from abroad. For low values of the outside option, that is, 0 ≤ γ < γ, the domes-
tic wage resulting from wage bargaining is below the critical level at which the possibility
of relocating becomes attractive for the mobile firm. There is no threat of offshoring, and
increasing outside opportunities are associated with higher wages in the sector.
For γ ≤ γ ≤ γ, the union has no leeway in negotiating a wage above the critical level ω˜
because it would have to accept lower wages for fewer workers. The presence of firm mobility
tames the union insofar as it is no longer able to take advantage of better outside options
for its workers.
In order to see what happens when γ > γ, we first look at γ = γ. In this case, both firms still
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produce domestically. If the outside option is marginally above γ, however, the negotiated
wage rises above ω˜ and the mobile firm moves offshore. Nevertheless, it is still not optimal
for the trade union to push for a wage rate above ω˜ because the benefit of a marginally
higher wage would come at the cost of losing the jobs provided by the mobile firm. This
is because according to (1), 2q(ω˜, ω˜) > q (ωrd(γ), ωf ). Close to γ, the wage-enhancing effect
associated with a marginal wage increase is of second order, while the employment-reducing
effect is of first order.
At γ = ω˜, where the union rent under a wage moderation strategy becomes zero, the union
rent is strictly higher in the regime with offshoring because all laid-off workers receive ω˜
and a few receive ωrd > ω˜ in such a case, whereas all trade union members receive ω˜ in
the symmetric case without offshoring. As a result, there is a critical level γ < γ∗ < ω˜ at
which the union becomes indifferent to following a low-wage/high-employment strategy or
a high-wage/low-employment strategy.
The lower part of figure 2 shows the corresponding union rents as a function of the out-
side option γ. First, according to (16), it is clear that the union rent θn under constrained
bargaining decreases linearly with γ, whereas the union rent arising from unconstrained
bargaining in the regime without offshoring decreases and is convex in γ (see appendix A.3).
Furthermore, note that by definition, θun(γ) = θ
c
n(γ) at γ = γ because ω
n(δ, γ) = ω˜(ωf ,K)
(see (15)). For values of γ above γ, the rent θcn is captured by the straight line, whereas θ
u
n
is shown by the dotted curve. The latter is only meaningful in the absence of firm mobility.
Since the union only extracts a rent as long as the negotiated wage exceeds the outside
option, we can state that θcn(γ) = 0⇔ γ = ω˜ and θun(γ) = 0⇔ γ = α > ω˜.
The union rent in the offshoring regime, θr(γ), is obtained by substituting (13) into (12).
It is also a monotonically decreasing and convex function of γ (see appendix A.4). In sec-
tion 4.2, we showed that for any given level of γ, both the negotiated wage and domestic
industry employment are unambiguously higher when both firms produce domestically and
the union is unconstrained from charging a wage above ω˜. Hence, for 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ, we
know that θn(γ) > θr(γ). Clearly, for γ > γ the union rents θcn and θr must intersect,
since θr(γ) = 0 ⇔ γ = γmax(ωf ,K) while θcn = 0 ⇔ γ = ω˜(ωf ,K). Since γ < ω˜ implies
K < K(ωf ) :=
2(α−ωf )2
9β , we can state that γmax(ωf ,K) > ω˜(ωf ,K).





ωn(δ, γ) if 0 ≤ γ < γ,
ω˜(ωf ,K) if γ ≤ γ < γ∗,
ωrd(δ, γ, ωf ) if γ
∗ ≤ γ < γmax.
This is illustrated by the bold line in the upper part of figure 2. Our findings so far can be
summarised by the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The labour union’s attitude towards offshoring depends on the income
workers can expect to obtain outside the industry. Specifically, if
(i) 0 ≤ γ < γ, the negotiated wage, ωn(δ, γ), is below the critical level that induces offshoring;
(ii) γ ≤ γ < γ∗, the union adopts a wage moderation strategy by setting the indifference
wage ω˜(ωf ,K) in such a way as to discourage the MNE from offshoring;
(iii) γ∗ ≤ γ < γmax, the union is not willing to moderate wages and adopts a high-wage/low-
employment strategy by demanding ωrd(δ, γ, ωf ) > ω˜(ωf ,K) and inducing offshoring.
5 Comparative statics: The impact of globalisation
Globalisation is generally associated with lower costs of mobility and a more intense com-
petitive environment worldwide. In this sense, our model allows us to explore the impact of
deeper international integration on the relationship between the workers’ expected outside
income and the equilibrium wage. The ω˜-line in the upper part of figure 2 indicates the in-
difference wage for the MNE as a function of the foreign wage rate and the fixed relocation
costs. As we have seen, lower values of K increase the attractiveness of the foreign country.
As illustrated in figure 3, the ω˜-line shifts downwards when K falls, so that γ and γ shift to
the left in parallel to γ′ and γ′, respectively. Hence, the lowest level of the outside option
that forces the trade union to moderate its wage demands decreases when K falls. Regard-
ing the critical level at which the union will switch from a wage moderation strategy to a
high-wage/low-employment strategy, it also falls unambiguously from γ∗ to γ∗′. In order
to see this, note that the kink in the θn-curve in the lower part of figure 3moves to the left
along the curve, as the straight line representing the union rent under constrained bargaining
rotates clockwise, connecting the points θn(γ′) and θn(ω˜′). Hence, the no-relocation rent
now lies below its previous position. Since the rent in the relocation case does not change,
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Figure 3: The effects of lower sunk firm relocation costs.
the intersection of the two curves θcn and θr is now at γ
∗′ < γ∗. Formally, one can show
that the union rent in the constrained bargaining regime is an increasing function of the
indifference wage (see appendix A.3). Consequently, for a given γ, θcn decreases as K – and
therefore ω˜ – decrease. Moreover, θcn is generally steeper than θ
u
n when γ = γ (see appendix
A.3).
Intuitively, γ∗ falls because lower mobility costs translate into a lower indifference wage and
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therefore θcn(γ) decreases, whereas θr(γ) remains unaffected as it captures the (anticipated)
union rent when the mobile firm has already relocated. Since the rent surplus depends on
the difference between the negotiated wage and the reservation wage γ, a drop in K leads
to a fall in the threshold γ∗ at which the union is indifferent to offshoring versus domestic
production.
Thus, the model supports the well-established result that the option of shifting production
abroad restrains unions and lowers wages (e.g. Mezzetti and Dinopoulos, 1991; Zhao, 1995;
Koskela and Scho¨b, 2009). However, our model relativises this result in that it predicts that
there is an interval [γ∗′; γ∗] where increased globalisation induces the union to switch from
a low-wage/high-employment strategy to a high-wage/low employment strategy and thus
trigger offshoring.
Proposition 2: Deeper economic integration in the form of lower mobility costs has the
following effects:
(i) The indifference wage falls, i.e. ∂ω˜∂K > 0;
(ii) The union is forced to moderate its wage demands at lower levels of γ, i.e.
∂γ
∂K > 0;
(iii) The threshold value for the workers’ outside option at which the union is indiffer-
ent regarding the mobile firm’s location falls, i.e. ∂γ
∗
∂K > 0. Hence, there exists an interval
[γ∗′; γ∗] where the trade union changes from a low-wage/high-employment strategy to a high-
wage/low-employment strategy.
Proposition 2 states that there is an interval where it is optimal for the trade union to
change its strategy when relocation costs K decrease. In the close neighbourhood to the
left of γ∗, a fall in K unambiguously goes hand in hand with higher equilibrium domestic
wages at the cost of an increase in the relocation-induced displacement of workers. More
precisely, whether or not offshoring leads to an increase in the domestic wage rate depends
on both the level of γ and the magnitude of the cost reduction, ∆K. Consider the case in
figure 3, where K falls by such an amount, (∆K)∗, such that the intersection of the shifted
θcn and θr-curves occurs at the initial γ, where ω˜ = ω
r
d. Then, for γ ∈ [γ′, γ] the union
continues to moderate wages and accept the lower indifference wage ω˜′. At γ = γ, however,
a marginal increase in γ induces the union to switch away from a wage-moderation strategy.
In this case, the wage negotiated with the immobile firm unambiguously exceeds the initial
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indifference wage, ω˜. However, if the size of the cost reduction exceeds (∆K)∗, the indif-
ference wage falls further so that γ∗′ < γ. Then, in the area just to the left of the initial
γ, it is optimal for the trade union to change to the high-wage strategy even if the nego-
tiated wage falls short of the initial indifference wage, ω˜. This can be summarised as follows:
Proposition 3: If increased globalisation due to falling K induces the trade union to give
up part of the workforce, the resulting negotiated wage depends on both the initial outside
option and the extent to which K is reduced. Specifically, let (∆K)∗ be the magnitude of the
cost reduction so that when γ = γ workers are indifferent to the mobile firm’s location, i.e.
θr(γ) = θcn(γ). Then,
(i) if ∆K ≤ (∆K)∗, γ∗′ ∈ (γ, γ∗) and for γ ≥ γ∗′ we obtain ωrd′ > ω˜;
(ii) if ∆K > (∆K)∗, γ∗′ ∈ (γ′, γ)
and for γ ∈ (γ∗′, γ) we obtain ωrd′ < ω˜
whereas for γ > γ we obtain ωrd
′ > ω˜.
We can also consider the effects of fiercer global competition in the form of lower variable
foreign labour costs, ωf . In that case, the potential profits obtainable abroad increase so
that the ω˜-line shifts downwards. Additionally, provided that the mobile firm produces
abroad, the effect of a lower foreign wage is to reduce the immobile firm’s profit, which
dampens the domestic wage rate (see equation (13)). For every level of γ, therefore, the
ωrd-line also shifts downwards. The overall effect is that both γ and γ shift to the left,
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the [γ, γ]-interval widens. Furthermore, since both the θcn(γ)-curve and the θr(γ)-curve in
the lower part of figure 3 shift downwards in this case, the overall effect on γ∗ is ambiguous
because of the countervailing effect created by fiercer oligopolistic competition. In other
words, a high-wage strategy involving offshoring and tough import competition, may be less
desirable than a wage moderation strategy. The interval in which the trade union changes
strategies becomes smaller, and the resulting wage will be lower.
6 General equilibrium and the welfare state
The government uses a labour tax to finance a public good G (which is assumed to en-
ter all individuals’ utilities in an additively separable manner) and unemployment benefit



















2qnN if the mobile firm does not relocate
qrNd otherwise
denotes domestic employment in sector N and ωN the negotiated wage in that sector. If we
define L =
∑
N QN as the aggregate employment level, noting that the total labour supply
is N , the unemployment rate is given by u = N−1(N − L).
The general equilibrium analysis takes the interaction between the different sectors into ac-
count. These interactions crucially depend on the assumption we make about the rest of
the economy. One possibility is to assume that the rest of the economy is characterised by a
competitive labour market. In this case, the outside income would correspond to γ = ω = ωc
where ωc refers to the gross wage rate in a competitive labour market. Alternatively, we
can assume that the other sectors are also unionised, in which case there is unemployment
in equilibrium. The extent to which unemployment affects the outside option depends on
whether laid-off workers in the industry in question are able to find employment elsewhere.
An empirical investigation by Burda and Mertens (2001) indicates that around 80% of all
workers in Germany who had been involuntarily dismissed from their jobs in 1986 had so-
cially insured employment even 4 years after displacement. Egger et al. (2007) examine
the consequences of relocating production for workers using individual-level panel data from
Austria. Their main finding is that outsourcing reduces the flow of worker to the sectors in
which the economy has a comparative disadvantage, which is not offset by a proportionate
inflow of workers to the sectors with a comparative advantage. This suggests that outsourc-
ing leads to an increase in net unemployment. Such a relationship is also supported by
Kletzer (2000) for the US. This points to the importance of the country’s unemployment
rate in determining the extent to which offshoring is prone to generating long-term unem-
ployment among workers who lose their jobs due to such shifts in production. We therefore
adopt the standard assumption that the outside option is given by (4), i.e. γ = (1−u)ω+ub.
Furthermore, we consider a country in which all sectors are exposed to offshoring. In order
20
to determine the general equilibrium, we assume that all sectors are symmetric. This implies
that all sector wages are the same in equilibrium, so that ωN = ω ≡ ω ∀ N . We proceed
by characterising the general equilibrium for the three potential wage regimes identified in
proposition 1, starting with the autarky case.
1. γ < γ
When offshoring is too expensive to be a credible threat in wage bargaining, the negotiations
in all sectors yield the wage rate (9) and subsequently sector employment (10). Addition-
ally, we have to consider the outside option, γ, which in equilibrium is determined by the
equilibrium wage rates and employment. We thus have three equations that must hold in
equilibrium:








F 2 : γ − (1− u)ω − ub = γ −
(
1− N − L
N
)
ω − N − L
N
b = 0






Furthermore, the balanced budget constraint (17) must be met. As we are interested in how
a more generous welfare system affects the labour market, we analyse how an increase in b,
indicating a more redistributive system, affects the wage rate and employment. Using total




L = −F ib , i = 1, 2, 3 and applying Cramer’s rule (see appendix A.5


















































An increase in unemployment benefit payments will increase gross wages, thus reducing ag-
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gregate employment. Hence, as long as offshoring is not an alternative for the mobile firm,
the model confirms standard results from the literature which show that there is a tradeoff
between a more redistributive system and employment (e.g. Nickell et al., 2005).
2. γ ≤ γ < γ∗
In this interval, the trade union will accept the indifference wage which ensures that the
mobile firm does not relocate abroad. The outside option is then given by γ = (1−u)ω˜+ub
but it is irrelevant in wage negotiations. Employment is given by (1). As long as an increase
in the outside option does not increase wages, it will have no effect on employment. Thus,











This result is in line with our finding in section 4. When offshoring becomes attractive for
the mobile firm, the best response on the trade union’s part is to moderate wages in such
a way that the mobile firm is kept in the home country. This fixes the wages and makes
them independent of the generosity of the welfare system. Furthermore, the financing of
more redistribution does not affect the gross wages as the entire incidence falls on net wages.
Even though the prospect of becoming unemployed becomes less distressful, overal domestic
employment is not affected. In effect, notwithstanding the presence of trade unions, re-
distribution becomes costless for the government because the wage is determined by forces
totally unrelated to the workers’ bargaining power. In fact, the major concern of workers
is for their labour costs to remain sufficiently attractive compared to mobile firms’ outside
opportunities, which are basically affected by K and ωf . If the government prefers more re-
distribution, it would be optimal from the government’s perspective to choose a replacement
ratio that just ensures γ∗. This result is in sharp contrast to the statement that globalisa-
tion leads to a race to the bottom among welfare states. An increase in b raises the outside
option but it has no repercussions for unemployment.
3. γ = γ∗
If we raise b at the critical level γ = γ∗, the outside option improves, ceteris paribus,
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∂γ∗/∂b = u. It becomes attractive for the trade unions to raise the wage above the indiffer-
ence level even if this compels the mobile firm to relocate abroad. If a first firm relocates,
however, the outside option γ falls until it reaches γ∗ again, in which case there is no incen-
tive for further unions to switch to the high-wage/low-employment strategy.
In order to show that the relocation of one firm from sector x dampens the outside option,
we rewrite γ as
γ =
∑
z 6=xQz(ωz − b) + qx(ωx − b)
N
+ b.
Before offshoring, we had [qx(ωx − b)] = 2qn(ω˜) (ω˜ − b) in sector x. After offshoring, we











d − 2qn(ω˜)ω˜ + b (2qn(ω˜)− qrd)] . (19)
At γ∗ we know that for each sector θn = θr, which according to (16) and (12) implies that





[−γ∗ (2qn(ω˜)− qrd) + b (2qn(ω˜)− qrd)] = −
2qn(ω˜)− qrd
N
(b− γ∗) < 0
since ω > b implies that γ∗ > b for any u < 1. Hence, the shift of one sector to a high-
wage/low-employment strategy that induces offshoring will lower the equilibrium outside
option. Therefore, as long as not all mobile firms have relocated, higher unemployment
benefit payments will trigger partial offshoring. For this case, our analysis thus shows that
a more generous welfare state creates adverse effects in the form of a lower domestic level
of employment. Beyond the marginal increase in unemployment caused by higher unem-
ployment benefits, also observed in the absence of offshoring, redistribution now leads to
outward firm relocations. The larger the sectors, the stronger the implications for unem-
ployment. Note that in this case there are two wages in equilibrium. While workers in those
sectors where the trade union still moderates wages only receive the indifference wage ω˜,
the high-wage/low-employment sectors pay a higher wage ωrd(γ
∗).
4. γ∗ < γ
If the outside option is sufficiently high, all mobile firms eventually relocate and the com-
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parative statics resembles those in case 1, albeit at lower employment levels. In other words,
we observe increasing wages and falling employment when unemployment benefit payments
are raised.


















autarky. Redistribution is costly as it increases wage demands and thus lowers employment.
Above γ, offshoring becomes attractive for mobile firms if trade unions demand sufficiently
high wages. This leads to wage moderation, which in turn enables the government to redis-
tribute income from workers to unemployed people at no cost. Although the outside option
increases linearly along with b, figure 2 already showed that this has no repercussions with
regard to allocation. This is possible until a critical value for the unemployment benefit
payment bno is reached. Beyond bno, a higher b prompts some firms to move offshore, which
in turn brings the outside option back down to γ∗. Thus, a more generous unemployment
benefit system has no effect on the outside option until the last sector has lost its mobile
firm. This is the case at ball, beyond which no sector is threatened by any further offshoring.
These findings can be summarised as follows:
Proposition 4: For any given degree of globalisation, a more generous unemployment
benefit system in the form of higher unemployment benefit payments b
(i) leads to higher domestic wages and lower employment without triggering offshoring if
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γ < γ;
(ii) does not affect domestic wages and employment and does not trigger offshoring if γ ≤
γ < γ∗;
(iii) causes offshoring and reduces employment if γ = γ∗. Domestic firms in sectors with
wage moderation continue to pay the indifference wage ω˜, while firms in the high-wage/low-
employment sectors pay the higher wage ωrd(γ
∗);
(iv) induces all remaining mobile firms across all sectors to relocate abroad and increases
domestic unemployment further, if γ > γ∗, where the wage rate for employed domestic





This paper has explored the implications of welfare policies for domestic employment and
wages in industries which are unionised and potentially affected by offshoring. In this con-
text, we have focused on the extent to which policies regarding unemployment insurance
affect the interaction between labour unions and oligopolistic firms, some of which are inter-
nationally mobile. More specifically, we were interested in the extent to which a generous
unemployment insurance system can be held responsible for the relocation-induced loss of
jobs, when the various actors’ incentives are taken into account.
A typical result in standard trade union models that ignore offshoring is that a more generous
welfare system leads to higher gross wages and a lower level of aggregate employment. This
is confirmed in our model for the benchmark case where offshoring is too expensive to pose a
threat in wage negotiations. If offshoring is a viable option and the workers’ fallback option
is sufficiently high, few domestic workers would benefit from higher wages, while many would
lose their jobs. Thus, trade unions are forced to moderate their wage demands by setting a
wage that leaves internationally mobile firms just indifferent to domestic production versus
offshoring. Such a wage is actually independent of the generosity of the welfare system. As
long as welfare arrangements are not too generous, the financing of additional redistribution
does not affect these gross wages so that the entire incidence falls on net wages. Hence,
redistribution from employed to unemployed individuals is non-distortive from the govern-
ment’s perspective. A government with a high preference for redistribution would therefore
optimally choose as high a level of unemployment insurance benefits as possible that is still
consistent with the union’s preference for wage moderation. This prediction only changes if
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the welfare system expands beyond a certain limit. Then some trade unions will opt for a
high-wage/low-employment strategy, which leads to offshoring and domestic job losses.
Our finding has interesting policy implications. Even if deeper economic integration dampens
the wage rate prevailing under a moderation regime, there is scope for substantial redistri-
bution without the threat of losing production. This runs counter to the widespread view
that globalisation leads to a race to the bottom in social policy. In fact, the opposite effect
emerges: The threat that some mobile firms might relocate abroad compels trade unions
to moderate wages and thus creates more leeway for the government to engage in redistri-
bution policies. Only if the welfare state’s engagement in redistribution reaches a critical
level that induces some offshoring will increased economic integration work to depress the
wage prevailing under a moderation regime and thus render a high-wage/low-employment
strategy more attractive. In this regard, our results support the finding in Keuschnigg and
Ribi (2009) that, in the presence of mobile production, redistribution might involve a smaller
efficiency cost than is commonly perceived. Rather than provoking a race to the bottom,
our analysis suggests that offshoring defines an upper limit for the generosity of the welfare
state below which, however, redistribution becomes less costly.
A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the equilibrium wage rate in the regime without
relocation
Define A ≡ 2(ω−γ)(1−τ)q(ω) and B ≡ 2βq2(ω) so that the Nash bargaining product given
by (8) corresponds to Ω(ω) = AδB1−δ. The first-order condition for an interior maximum
of (8) over ω is then given by
δAδ−12(1− τ)
(















δ (α− 2ω + γ)− 2(1− δ)(ω − γ) =
δα+ (2− δ)γ − 2ω = 0
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A.2 Derivation of the equilibrium wage rate in the relocation regime
Define C ≡ 2(ωd−γ)(1− τ)qd(ωd, ωf ) and D ≡ 2β [qd(ωd, ωf )]2 so that the Nash bargaining
product (11) corresponds to Ωr(ωd) = CδD1−δ. The first-order condition with respect to
the domestic wage rate is then given by
δCδ−1(1− τ)
(










qd(ωd, ωf ) + (ωd − γ)∂qd(ωd, ωf )
∂ωd
)
+ 2(1− δ)∂qd(ωd, ωf )
∂ωd
=
δ (α+ ωf + 2γ − 4ωd)− 4(1− δ)(ωd − γ) =
δ(α+ ωf ) + 2(2− δ)γ − 4ωd = 0
A.3 How the union rent depends on the workers’ outside option
and the indifference wage when mobile firms do not relocate
abroad
It is easy to show that the union rent under unconstrained bargaining conditions in the



































(1− τ) > 0
since ∂q
n
∂γ < 0 and
∂ωn
∂γ = 1− δ2 < 1.











(1− τ) > 0⇔ qn(ω˜) + ∂q
n
∂ω˜
(ω˜ − γ) > 0⇔ α− 2ω˜ + γ > 0
Since the left hand side of the latter inequality is increasing with γ and since the lowest
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value of γ consistent with wage moderation is γ, we substitute γ = γ. Using (3) we have
(1− δ)
[
α− ωf − 9β4(α− ωf )K
]
> 0 ∀ K < K(ωf ).




holds if 2qn(ω˜) > δqn(γ)+(ωn(γ)− γ) 2−δ3β which when setting γ = γ holds if α−2ω˜+γ > 0.
Substituting ω˜ and γ with (3) and (15), respectively, yields 2(1 − δ)(α − ω˜) > 0 ∀ K <
K(ωf ).
A.4 How the union rent in the relocation regime depends on the
workers’ outside options




















































∂γ = 1− δ2 < 1.
A.5 Derivation of the determinant














































1 − (1− δ2) 0
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